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A
mAbstract
This paper examines how peer quality within distinct college majors affects
graduation rates and major persistence. To mitigate the selection problem, we
control for school-specific fixed effects, as well as very flexible application-
admissions pattern fixed effects. Non-science peer quality appears to have a
positive effect on both the likelihood that a student chooses a science major and
on his or her cumulative GPA. Conversely, students who attend campuses with
stronger peers in the sciences are less likely to graduate with a science degree.
Weaker, non-minority students typically react to stronger peers in the sciences by
shifting majors. Under-represented minorities tend to persist in the sciences regardless
of peer quality, but in more competitive programs they suffer – often substantially – in
terms of college grades and the likelihood of graduating.
JEL codes: I21, J24
Keywords: College major choice; Mismatch; Peer Effects1 Introduction
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) training is an important
driver of economic growth and innovation in the United States. Not surprisingly, there is
great public interest in promoting policies that improve the breadth and depth of
STEM skills in the American workforce. Undergraduate education is a critical part of
the STEM pipeline. Some studies suggest that college students may benefit by attending
academic institutions with stronger peers. However, the peer dynamics found in
university-level STEM courses are potentially drastically different from those seen
in the sorts of academic contexts commonly evaluated in the peer effects literature. In
STEM classes, rigid grading curves are prevalent and peer competition is often fierce.
This paper is one of the first studies to empirically test how the competitive environ-
ment found in university-level STEM courses mediates the influence of peer quality on
the college outcomes of intending science majors.
The effect of peer quality on STEM achievement is also of great interest for the affirma-
tive action debate (Elliott et al. 1996). African-Americans are especially underrepresented
in STEM fields, even though they are even more likely than whites to express interest in a
science career as high school seniors (Astin and Astin, 1993). Young whites are nearly three
times as likely as blacks to achieve a bachelor's degree in a STEM field and nearly seven
times as likely to achieve a doctorate in the sciences (author’s calculation from US Census
Bureau 2003). A central argument in favor of affirmative action policies is that such policies2015 Luppino and Sander; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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of studies have suggested that large preferences may have counter-productive effects (Sowell
1972; Loury and Garman 1995). In particular, they may cause science-interested minorities
to shift out of undergraduate STEM fields because of the difficulties of competing with
students with stronger academic preparation. If STEM training benefits from positive peer
externalities, then one would expect affirmative action to promote diversity within the
scientific workforce. Conversely, affirmative action policies would potentially have the
perverse effect of undermining diversity in the sciences if net peer effects are negative in
university-level STEM courses. To the extent that minorities that benefit from affirmative
action have skill deficits relative to their university peers (i.e., they are mismatched), such
relative deficits may exacerbate any negative peer effects in the sciences or negate any
positive average peer effects. Therefore, our paper additionally aims to evaluate any
mismatch effects on STEM attrition and to better understand how peer quality influences
the major choice and final college outcomes of minorities pursuing STEM majors.
In our analysis, we take advantage of a very large dataset covering all freshmen enrol-
lees at the eight undergraduate campuses of the University of California over a nine-
year period.1 These campuses have many functional similarities – they are all public,
they are similar in size, they have common entrance requirements and a common
administration – but they embrace a wide range of student competitiveness. At UC
Berkeley, the median student has SAT scores that place her at the 91st percentile of all
American students taking the SAT; at the least elite UC campuses, the median student
has SAT scores that place her at the 62nd percentile. While all UC students are academ-
ically stronger than the average American college student, this range of entering cre-
dentials is much broader than that observed in most other studies of peer effects.
Because of the extremely rich data we have on application and admission patterns
across all eight campuses, we are able to effectively address selection problems by
building upon and improving on the strategy used by Dale and Krueger (2002) in their
well-known study of the effects of college eliteness on earnings. Specifically, we control
for very flexible application-admissions pattern fixed effects to account for student un-
observed characteristics, as well as school-specific fixed effects to account for typically
unobserved institutional characteristics that are plausibly correlated with peer quality
and student outcomes. We find strong support for the role of peer effects, and signifi-
cant support for the mismatch effect as it is usually defined. We also suggest issues to
pursue in future research.
2 Related literature
Because of concerns about potential selection bias resulting from non-random college
enrollment patterns, research on peer effects in higher education have tended to examine
particular academic settings where certain peer groups are randomly or quasi-randomly
assigned. Using data from a middle-sized public university in southern Italy, Brunello
et al. (2010) find that students with academically stronger roommates achieved signifi-
cantly higher grades in the hard sciences; they also found no measureable peer effect upon
grades achieved in the humanities and social sciences. Similarly, Carrell et al. (2009) find
positive academic peer-effects resulting from the random assignment to squadron at the
United States Air Force Academy, with particularly notable results in math and science
courses. Other studies, such as Sacerdote (2001) and Foster (2006), that have looked at
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lar academic institutions.
A necessary limitation of studies that focus on roommates or smaller peer groups is that
they may not provide us with relevant information that would allow us to project how an
individual’s outcomes would differ if his or her entire cohort of peers were to change
(as would result from a change in college attended). Specifically, the peer dynamics that
occur between roommates and within smaller college peer groups are potentially different
from those that occur at the more macro peer group level. In our analysis we focus on
major groupings as the relevant peer groups that determine persistence in the sciences.
The general literature that looks at attrition from STEM majors also suggests that
peer dynamics may function differently in university-level science courses than in other
academic settings. Tobias and Lin (1991) note that introductory STEM courses
typically have competitive, rather than cooperative, learning environments. Lipson and
Tobias (1991) argue that the prevalence of curve-grading systems in STEM classes
leads to peer competition that is often aggressive and cutthroat. As a result, students with
high academic ability who might otherwise thrive in the sciences are pushed out. Others,
who reject the culture of competition found in the sciences, opt out. Ours is one of the
first studies to empirically test whether the competitive environment found in university-
level STEM courses fundamentally impacts how peer quality affects student outcomes.
In considering policies that might promote the production of science graduates, one should
be particularly interested in the likely outcomes of those students who are on the margin of
successfully obtaining a STEM degree or failing to do so. Ost (2010) examines longitudinal
data from a single large elite research university and finds that the students who are less
likely to persist in the sciences particularly benefit from taking courses with more per-
sistent science peers. Carrel et al. (2009) also find that students with lower academic
ability particularly benefited from being assigned to a squadron with stronger peers.
However, in a subsequent follow-up study, Carrell et al. (2013) deliberately assigned
students to control and treatment groups, with the treatment groups aimed at
maximizing the academic success of students arriving with the weakest academic
preparation by pairing them with stronger peers. Contrary to expectations, the
low-preparation students assigned to the treatment group “avoided the peers with
whom we intended them to interact and instead formed more homogenous sub-
groups,” and had worse academic outcomes than similar students assigned to the con-
trol group. Several studies that have focused on the mismatch between a student’s own
ability and that of her peers also find that weaker STEM students have worse academic
outcomes when paired with stronger peers.2 In our analysis, we also consider whether
peer ability of different major groups has heterogenous effects by student ability.
Studies that attempt to identify average peer effects or heterogeneous peer effects for
lower ability (potentially mismatched) students face the strong challenge of dealing with
endogeneity resulting from the college admission and enrollment process. Specifically,
since students enrolled at the same campus faced the same admission process, individ-
ual observed and unobserved ability is likely to be highly correlated with peer ability.
The key contribution of our work is that we are able to take advantage of a rich dataset
that allows us to take a number of steps to ensure that our findings are not contami-
nated by selection bias. Furthermore, this data allows us to examine major group peer
effects in a broader range of academic institutions.
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The University of California Office of the President (UCOP) maintains extensive and
largely consistent databases on every student that has enrolled at the university since
1992. In 2007, a group of economists approached UCOP about studying the effects of
Proposition 209 (which banned race preferences at the university for cohorts admitted
in 1998 and later) upon academic outcomes (Arcidiacono et al. 2012). In 2008 and
2010, UCOP released a public-use version of its database. Most relevant for our pur-
poses, the dataset contains nearly forty variables on every freshman applicant to a UC
campus from 1995 through 2003. Among the variables are the identity of each campus
to which a student applied, which campuses admitted the student, and whether (and
where) the student enrolled. The data also includes information on each student’s
planned field of study and a range of information about high school and standardized
test performance. For all enrollees, the dataset includes information on college grades,
final field of study, and time to graduation (if the student graduated).
For privacy reasons, UCOP collapsed student observations in a variety of ways. SAT
scores are reported in forty-point ranges, for example, and college GPAs are reported
in one-tenth point increments. However, this data does include an exact academic
index score, which UCOP constructed as a linear combination of each student’s high
school GPA, SAT I verbal, and SAT I math scores based on pre-assigned weights. A po-
tential issue with this index score is that the way that it weights these three measures
of high school credentials is not necessarily appropriate for an investigation of the de-
terminants of success in the sciences.3 Therefore, we use these two sets of information
on high school credentials to impute precise high school GPA, SAT verbal, and SAT
math scores and use these imputed variables in the analysis that follows.4 Details on
the methodology used to impute high school grades and SAT scores are reported in the
Appendix.
Another data issue, also arising from UCOP’s privacy concerns, is the grouping of
student observations into three-year cohorts (the cohorts of interest here are freshmen
entering in 1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003). The measures of peer characteris-
tics that we use in our analysis thus pertain to these three-year cohorts instead of more
refined entering-class cohorts. If the relevant peer group is the entering-class cohort in-
stead of the three-year cohort, this aggregation will produce measurement error in our
peer group measures. However because our peer measures are based on cohort aver-
ages, OLS estimates will remain consistent when using the three-year cohort aggre-
gates.5 The standard errors of our estimated peer effects, of course, will be larger than
in the case where entering-class cohort measures were available.
Finally, the data does not contain information on gender and does not distinguish be-
tween black and Hispanic students, categorizing both as under-represented minorities.
We would definitely expect student ability and preferences towards the sciences to vary
by gender and possibly by minority subgroups. Because we do not observe this infor-
mation in the data, it is again important that we use an identification strategy that
accounts for unmeasured student qualifications and/or preferences that might influence
both the selection of a student’s enrollment campus and his or her subsequent
outcomes.
We have restricted our sample to students that are not missing information on
personal characteristics and college outcomes. Summary statistics for this sample are
Table 1 Sample means (Standard Deviations in Brackets)
All Intended major
Students Science Non-science
Asian 38% 46% 34%
Black or Hispanic 17% 14% 18%
White 37% 32% 39%
Other 8% 8% 9%
Math SAT score 613 636 601
[89] [87] [88]
Verbal SAT score 578 580 577
[93] [94] [92]
UC-Adjusted HS GPA 3.77 3.86 3.72
[0.43] [0.41] [0.44]
Cumulative college GPA 3.01 2.92 3.06
[0.59] [0.60] [0.58]
Declared science as final major 28% 61% 11%
Graduated from college 82% 81% 82%
w/ science degree 24% 49% 10%
Time to degree (Quarters) 12.71 12.95 12.58
[1.50] [1.52] [1.46]
Observations 241,062 84,466 156,596
Notes: The sample consists of three cohorts of students that enrolled in one of 8 UC campuses for the periods
1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003.
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have stronger high school credentials (in terms of SAT I scores and high school grades)
than students intending to pursue a non-STEM major. However, these same students
achieve a slightly lower graduation rate and lower cumulative college GPA than
students intending to pursue a non-STEM major.
Only 49 percent of intending science majors actually graduate with a science degree.
The outflow of students from the sciences is not counterbalanced by a comparable
inflow of students from other fields. Only 10 percent of students that do not initially
intend to pursue a STEM major end up doing so.4 Empirical strategy
The following framework guides our thinking about how major peer groups affect college
outcomes.4.1 Conceptual framework
Students take courses in different major fields, and their course-level outcomes are
potentially determined, at least in part, by the characteristics of the peers that share
these courses. One particularly important outcome is average grades earned in each
major j g ji
 
, as students need to satisfy minimum GPA requirements within their
chosen major in order to obtain a degree in that field. The average grades earned in
major j courses by student i:
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 
ð1Þ
are likely to be determined by her own aptitude for major j (a), the quality of peers in
major j courses (q), and a random shock η.
Students must consider the likelihood that they will successfully attain or exceed
minimum grade and credit hour requirements both overall as well as within their
chosen major field. In deciding on their college major, students are faced with a degree
progress production function:
dji ¼ dj g ij; g i−j; hi; σ ij
 
; ð2Þ
where g−j is the GPA earned in non-major field courses, h is the total number of credithours earned by the student, and σ is the share of all credit hours taken in major field
courses. The student successfully obtains a degree in major j if her degree progress
exceeds the minimum standard (d) for that major set by the college:
Dji ¼ 1 if dji ≥ d j ð3Þ
A student receives current and future utility (V):V ji ¼ V Y Dji; ei
 
; γ Dji; ui
  
; ð4Þ
where this utility is a function of the pecuniary (Y) and non-pecuniary (γ) benefits that
student i receives from studying major j. Specifically, we can think of Y as a vector of the
lifetime earnings stream that student i receives from having pursued studies in major j.
Similarly, we can think of γ as a vector of the lifetime non-pecuniary benefit stream
that i experiences as a result of studying major j. Each of these benefit streams poten-
tially depend on whether the student successfully obtains a degree in major j and a
series of random shocks e and u. A student chooses a major j* that maximizes
expected current and future utility:





To further simplify things, let us assume that students choose between two majors:STEM (S) and non-STEM (N). Whether a student obtains a STEM degree is dependent
on both her utility-maximizing decision and how successful the student is in meeting
the minimum requirements of her desired major. It follows that the reduced form
model of this outcome is:
DSi ¼ f aSi ; aNi ; qS; qN ; d S; dN ; vSi ; vNi ; εi
 
; ð6Þ
where vSi and v
N
i represent preference parameters of student i for each major, and εi
represents a composite random shock.
4.2 Empirical specification
The basic specification that we use in our empirical analysis is:
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where we look at a number of outcomes of interest, yikasc. The main independent
variable of interest, qSikc , is a peer quality index for the other intending STEM majors
at campus k in three-year cohort c. Similarly, qNikc is a peer quality index for non-STEM
majors. We define major peer groups according to the intended major each student
states on her college application to her enrollment campus and use principal compo-
nent analysis to construct the major-specific peer quality indices. Specifically, we use
the principal component of average peer high school GPA, math SAT I score, and
verbal SAT I score for each major group.6
The main coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. Findings from the general peer effects
literature would appear to suggest that these two coefficients should be positive. How-
ever, as noted previously, the academic environment found in the sciences is potentially
very competitive, where stronger students may push their peers down the grading curve
in university-level STEM courses. If this type of competition dominates any positive
peer interactions in the sciences, than one might expect β1 to be negative.
Given that the within-campus variance in our peer measures is small, we cluster our
standard errors by campus. We additionally take steps to address concerns that cluster-
robust standard errors may be downwards biased, given the small number of clusters in
our analysis. All tables report statistical significance based on critical values from a t-
distribution with five degrees of freedom. We also calculate p-values for our regressors of
interest using the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure advocated by Cameron et al. (2008).
Our main concern in trying to identify the effects of major peer groups on different
college outcomes is that students selectively enroll in colleges with different peer char-
acteristics. Peer characteristics are likely to be correlated with other institutional char-
acteristics (e.g., campus resources, faculty quality, academic standards, etc.) that affect
student outcomes. In order to account for these institutional differences, our specifica-
tion includes enrollment campus fixed effects (μk).
An additional concern in analyzing our particular data is that the University of Cali-
fornia made substantive changes to its admissions policies over this period. Prior to the
adoption of Proposition 209 and continuing through the 1997 cohort, all underrepre-
sented minorities received admissions preferences which varied by campus. Beginning
with the fall of 2001, the UC system guaranteed the top 4 percent of students in the
graduating class of every California high school UC eligibility if they had completed 11
specific college prep courses by the end of their junior year. This policy, known as
“Eligibility in the Local Context” or ELC, was implemented to encourage students who
had excelled academically in disadvantaged high schools to attend UC campuses.7 Sub-
sequent changes in enrollment patterns (and, therefore, in peer competition) tended to
vary by the selectivity of the different campuses.
In order to account for these types of trends, our specification also includes campus se-
lectivity tier by cohort fixed effects (δsc). We group campuses into selectivity tiers based
on their 1995 U.S. News & World Report rankings. Berkeley and UCLA, ranked 26th and
28th overall, are grouped in the top tier. Davis (40th), San Diego (43rd), and Irvine (48th)
are grouped in the middle tier, and the remaining campuses are grouped in the bottom
tier.8 These fixed effects additionally account for any general time trends in the data.
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enrollment campus are also likely to directly affect his or her subsequent outcomes. Our
empirical model includes a vector of observable student characteristics (Xic) that control
for SAT I math and verbal scores, high school GPA, parental education, and family in-
come.9 We also include in our specification very flexible application-admissions pattern
fixed effects (Aac) to account for student unobservables. The UCOP data provides us with
information on which UC campuses each student submitted applications to, whether the
stated major on each application was a STEM major, and whether the application was ac-
cepted. For each of the 8 UC campuses, each student has seven possible application-
admission outcomes: (1) did not apply, (2) applied with an intended non-STEM major
and rejected, (3) applied with an intended STEM major and rejected, (4) applied with an
intended non-STEM major and accepted, (5) applied with an intended STEM major and
accepted, (6) applied with an intended non-STEM major and admissions outcome miss-
ing, and (7) applied with an intended STEM major and admissions outcome missing.
While there are 7 to the 8th power application-admission patterns that are theoretically
possible, we only observe 11,281 unique combinations for intending STEM majors and
30,803 for all students in our sample. Additionally, we allow these fixed effects to vary by
whether the student was eligible for an admissions preference and by cohort, since the ad-
missions regime employed by the UC system changed over time.
Our analysis focuses on four key outcomes that we observe in the data: cumulative
GPA, whether a student intending to major in the sciences persists in the sciences,
whether a student graduates, and whether students achieve both science-persistence
and graduation. Major-specific grades would appear to be the most appropriate
outcome for testing the effects of major-specific peer quality. Unfortunately, we do not
observe major-specific grades and instead only observe cumulative GPA. It is important
to note, however, that cumulative GPA is a weighted average of grades obtained in
STEM and non-STEM courses. Specifically,
g ¼ σSgS þ 1−σS gN ; ð8Þ
where σS is the share of all credit hours taken in the STEM field. We can potentially
characterize the likely effects of peer quality within each major field on major-specific
grades based on our analyses of cumulative GPA and major choice.
Let us assume that the peer quality of intending majors in field j has little to no
impact on grades outside of that major (i.e., ∂g
−j
∂qj ¼ 0).10 It then follows that the net ef-
fect of peer quality on cumulative GPA aggregates the effects of peer quality on major-
specific grades and on the choice of STEM course load such that:
∂g
∂qj
¼ σ j ∂g
j
∂qj
þ gS−gN  ∂σS
∂qj
; ð9Þ
where σN = 1 − σS.
The literature and our data suggest that average grades in non-STEM courses are
higher than average grades in STEM courses (i.e., gS−gN < 0). Our analysis of the effect
of peer quality on major choice will also allow us to infer the sign of ∂σ
S
∂qj . Therefore,
certain sets of results from our analysis of major choice and cumulative GPA will allow
us to bound the effect of peer quality on major-specific grades. Specifically,
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Graduation outcomes depend on whether students attain or exceed minimum grade
and credit hour requirements both overall and within their chosen major field. There-
fore, the effect of peer quality on whether the student earns a bachelor’s degree (b) is
driven, in turn, by the effects of peer quality on grades and credit hours. If we again
assume no cross-major peer effects and that major choice, independent of grades, does












We do not observe the credit hours taken by students or any comparable measuresof length of enrollment.11 If we find similar effects of peer quality on grades and the
likelihood of graduation, it could be the case that graduation effects are driven purely
by grade effects (or that there are also countervailing or reinforcing effects on enroll-
ment length).
5 Results
We begin by examining the effect of major group peer ability on the likelihood that
students graduate with a science degree. These results are presented in Table 2. A
student’s own high school credentials are highly statistically significant predictors of
whether he or she graduates with a science degree. As expected, students with higher
math SAT scores are more likely to obtain science degrees, while students with higher
verbal SAT score are less likely.
When a student attends a campus with stronger peers in the sciences, he or she is
less likely to graduate with a science degree. Specifically, we find that increasing the
ability of intending science major peers by a standard deviation decreases the likelihood
of graduating with a science degree by ten percentage points. Conversely, attending a
college with stronger peers in the non-sciences increases the likelihood that students
pursue and obtain a STEM degree. Increasing the ability of intending non-science
major peers by a standard deviation increases the likelihood of graduating with a STEM
degree by roughly nine percentage points. The corresponding wild cluster bootstrap-t
p-value for each of these peer effects is less than 0.02.
The results in Table 2 and subsequent tables are able to improve upon the identifica-
tion strategy used in Dale and Kruger (2002). Dale and Kruger used information on
student applications, and on which colleges accepted them, to compare students who
were accepted by similar schools but in fact attended schools with differing levels of
eliteness. We are able to go a step further. Because we have such a large number of
observations in the UC dataset, and successive cohorts at each of the institutions we
study, we are able to compare students who applied to, and were accepted by, the exact
same sets of schools, and we also use college fixed effects, which account for potential
differences that influence both the enrollment decision of students and their subse-
quent outcomes. It is worth noting that our results are robust to alternative strategies
of accounting for student unobservables.
Table 2 Determinants of graduating with a science degree
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Peer Ability Index:
Intended Science Majors 0.000721 −0.0562 −0.0976** −0.0804** −0.100***
[0.0613] [0.0385] [0.0287] [0.0224] [0.0259]
Intended Non-science Majors −0.0211 0.0339 0.0929** 0.0785** 0.0944**
[0.0636] [0.0380] [0.0346] [0.0280] [0.0284]
Own Characteristics:
Math SAT Score 0.117*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.0669*** 0.0669***
[0.0107] [0.0106] [0.0106] [0.00712] [0.00712]
Verbal SAT Score −0.0375*** −0.0361*** −0.0351*** −0.0237*** −0.0237***
[0.00472] [0.00422] [0.00403] [0.00258] [0.00258]
UC-Adjusted High School GPA 0.0927*** 0.0853*** 0.0848*** 0.0535*** 0.0535***
[0.0108] [0.00949] [0.00954] [0.00647] [0.00647]
Asian 0.0794*** 0.0568*** 0.0563*** 0.0382*** 0.0383***
[0.00750] [0.00720] [0.00745] [0.00718] [0.00718]
Black or Hispanic 0.0280*** 0.0194** 0.0221*** −0.00334 −0.00334
[0.00467] [0.00527] [0.00560] [0.00502] [0.00504]
Other Non-white Race/Ethnicity 0.0315*** 0.0241*** 0.0250*** 0.0192*** 0.0192***
[0.00449] [0.00382] [0.00415] [0.00445] [0.00445]
Fixed Effects:
Application-Admission Pattern No Yes Yes No No
Application-Admission Pattern No No No Yes Yes
(w/ Application Major Preferences)
College No No Yes Yes Yes
College Selectivity Tier by Cohort No No No No Yes
Observations 241,062 241,062 241,062 241,062 241,062
R-squared 0.108 0.126 0.127 0.403 0.403
Notes: Each column contains coefficient estimates from separate regressions. Each regression also contains college and
college selectivity tier by cohort fixed effects as well as controls for parental education and family income by cohort.
Robust standard errors, clustered by college, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, based on a
t-distribution with 5 d.f.
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(Model 5) and do two things: first, we break students into those who, as high school se-
niors, intended to major in STEM fields, and those who did not; second, we examine
several college outcomes: GPA, time to degree, graduating, graduating with a STEM
degree, and ending one’s UC career (with or without a degree) as a STEM major. These
results tell us several valuable things. First, we can see that the peer-effect results in
Table 2 – although they hold for all students – are largely driven by students who ini-
tially intend, upon starting college, to major in STEM fields.12 That is to say, the coeffi-
cients for the peer ability effects in Table 3 are generally larger and more precisely
estimated than those reported in Table 4. Tables 3 and 4 also allow us to explore the
multitude of ways in which a student may fail to obtain a science degree. One possibil-
ity is that an intending science major changes fields but still goes on to graduate from
college. Another is that the student fails to graduate in any field.13 Our findings suggest










Intended STEM Majors −0.196*** −0.105* −0.158*** −0.150*** 0.421**
[0.0390] [0.0444] [0.0409] [0.0176] [0.159]
Intended Non-STEM 0.217*** 0.143** 0.0498 0.122*** −0.452***
Majors [0.0347] [0.0466] [0.0306] [0.0151] [0.127]
Own Characteristics:
Math SAT Score 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.0824*** 0.0154*** −0.0967***
[0.00844] [0.00938] [0.00569] [0.00223] [0.0242]
Verbal SAT Score −0.0242*** −0.0271*** 0.0616*** −0.00106 −0.0367**
[0.00315] [0.00458] [0.00354] [0.00378] [0.0107]
UC-Adjusted HS GPA 0.111*** 0.0634*** 0.283*** 0.0846*** −0.312***
[0.00551] [0.00787] [0.00592] [0.00416] [0.0171]
Asian 0.0437*** 0.0276** −0.0474** 0.0225*** 0.0549*
[0.00979] [0.00985] [0.0134] [0.00510] [0.0279]
Black or Hispanic −0.0240* −0.00941 −0.106*** −0.0307** 0.414***
[0.0109] [0.0134] [0.0172] [0.00883] [0.0613]
Other non-white 0.0252** 0.0197** −0.0250* 0.00989 0.0976**
Race/ethnicity [0.00986] [0.00672] [0.0108] [0.00639] [0.0367]
Observations 84,466 84,466 83,683 84,466 67,593
R-squared 0.306 0.289 0.435 0.306 0.316
Notes: Each column contains coefficient estimates from separate regressions. Each regression also contains controls for
parental education, family income by cohort, college, college selectivity tier by cohort, and UC application-admission
pattern fixed effects that account for the intended major listed on each application. Robust standard errors, clustered by
campus, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, based on a t-distribution with 5 d.f.
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of major peer groups and that the nature of these peer effects varies by major field.
Non-STEM peer quality appears to have a positive effect on both the likelihood of
choosing a STEM major and on cumulative GPA for both intended STEM majors and
those intending a non-STEM major. Increasing the ability of non-STEM major peers
by a standard deviation increases the likelihood that an intending STEM major stays
in the sciences by just over fourteen percentage points. While the sign and magni-
tudes of these effects are similar to what we find when looking at the likelihood of
graduating with a science degree, the statistical precision of these particular
estimates are much lower (especially when evaluated with the wild cluster bootstrap-
t procedure). As we have argued in the previous section, this pattern of results suggests
that the positive effect of non-STEM peer quality on non-STEM GPA is even higher
than that estimated for cumulative GPA. Therefore, the type of peer effects that we
see in the non-sciences is similar to those found in the broader peer effects
literature.
Conversely, we find that STEM peer quality has a negative effect on both the likeli-
hood of choosing a STEM major and on cumulative GPA. This holds for both students
with and without an intended STEM major. Specifically, increasing the ability of other
intending STEM major peers by a standard deviation increases the likelihood that a










Intended STEM Majors −0.0303 −0.0356* −0.167** −0.0704** −0.0673
[0.0167] [0.0161] [0.0594] [0.0267] [0.130]
Intended Non-STEM 0.0345* 0.0330* 0.137* 0.0867** −0.168
Majors [0.0157] [0.0148] [0.0703] [0.0279] [0.0885]
Own Characteristics:
Math SAT score 0.0479*** 0.0510*** 0.0257*** 0.00478** 0.000716
[0.00607] [0.00608] [0.00518] [0.00182] [0.0102]
Verbal SAT score −0.0219*** −0.0241*** 0.0989*** 0.000802 −0.0809***
[0.00360] [0.00387] [0.00359] [0.00276] [0.0129]
UC-adjusted HS GPA 0.0315*** 0.0307*** 0.241*** 0.0635*** −0.279***
[0.00518] [0.00523] [0.00731] [0.00550] [0.0249]
Asian 0.0335*** 0.0349*** −0.0740*** 0.0219** 0.118***
[0.00636] [0.00658] [0.00928] [0.00613] [0.0280]
Black or Hispanic 0.00115 0.000968 −0.101*** −0.0225** 0.325***
[0.00372] [0.00360] [0.0147] [0.00720] [0.0298]
Other non-white 0.0157*** 0.0177*** −0.0236*** 0.00206 0.0944***
Race/ethnicity [0.00317] [0.00410] [0.00438] [0.00208] [0.0201]
Observations 156,596 156,596 153,010 156,596 125,909
R-squared 0.266 0.273 0.392 0.201 0.247
Notes: Each column contains coefficient estimates from separate regressions. Each regression also contains controls for
parental education, family income by cohort, college, college selectivity tier by cohort, and UC application-admission
pattern fixed effects that account for the intended major listed on each application. Robust standard errors, clustered by
campus, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, based on a t-distribution with 5 d.f.
Luppino and Sander IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:4 Page 12 of 23student switches to a non-STEM field by around ten percentage points. We also find
a negative effect of the ability of STEM peers on the college grades of intending
science majors, which is statistically significant according to the wild cluster bootstrap-t
procedure. This suggests that the negative effect of STEM peer quality on STEM
grades is even more severe than that estimated for cumulative GPA. Therefore, our
results suggest that peer effect dynamics in university-level science courses are
fundamentally different than those of the other academic environments typically
evaluated by the peer effects literature.
We also find evidence that the academic strength of STEM peers affects the chances
that an intending STEM major will graduate from college with any degree (including a
non-STEM degree). Increasing the ability of other intending science major peers by a
standard deviation decreases the likelihood that an intending STEM major graduates
from college (in any field) by around 15 percentage points.14 The magnitude of this ef-
fect is somewhat larger than our estimated effect on major-switching (i.e., leaving a
STEM field). For those who graduate, we find that having stronger STEM peers in-
creases the time to degree. One way to think about these results is that students who
face difficult competition in a STEM field must make a choice: they can switch to a
non-STEM field, which will probably entail staying in college longer; they can persist in
the major, perhaps with low grades, or they can drop out.
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STEM majors, it could be the case that this mechanism lessens the likelihood that
these students will fail to meet graduation grade requirements. Non-STEM peer ability
has a positive effect on the likelihood that intending science majors graduate from
college that is highly statistically significant according to the wild cluster bootstrap-t
procedure. These results also suggest that higher quality peers in non-STEM courses
may lessen the risk of taking more STEM courses (where expected grades are lower
than non-STEM courses), leading to greater STEM persistence.5.1 Heterogeneous effects by student ability (evidence on mismatch effects)
To this point, we have found that the college outcomes of intending science students
are influenced by peer effects on average. However, we have not considered the possi-
bility that these peer effects might be moderated by a student’s own ability. The
mismatch literature has specifically suggested that placing students in strong academic
environments might have large, negative effects on less academically prepared students.
To test for this possibility, we include interaction terms between “own ability” and peer
ability in our specifications. Our prior estimates suggests that higher student math abil-
ity increases the likelihood of declaring a STEM final major, while higher student verbal
ability increases the probability of choosing a non-STEM final major. Therefore, we
interact STEM peer ability with own math SAT score and non-STEM peer ability with
own verbal SAT score.
In accord with the mismatch hypothesis, we find that a student’s persistence in science
is particularly hurt by stronger peers when the student’s own math ability is relatively low.
As shown in Table 5, the interaction term between a student’s own math SATand the abil-
ity of STEM major peers is substantial and positive. This suggests that if the ability of
intending STEM major peers increases by one standard deviation, the student’s likelihood
of having a STEM “final major” drops 13 percentage points if the student’s own math SAT
is 550, but only 11 points if the student’s own math SAT is 650.
While own math ability does appear to moderate the effect that STEM major peer
ability has on science persistence, it does not appear to influence peer effects on the
likelihood of graduating or on cumulative college grades. All else equal, we would
expect that shifting out of the sciences would increase cumulative GPA. We find that
weaker students are more likely to exit the STEM track in response to higher STEM
peer quality. Thus, the fact that we find no differential effect of peer quality on cumulative
GPA based on own student ability suggests that higher STEM peer quality has a more
severe negative impact on the STEM grades of less prepared students. This finding is also
consistent with the mismatch hypothesis.
Here, we have evaluated whether peer effects are heterogeneous by own ability by
including a simple linear interaction term. We find very similar results when we
express own ability as a series of dummy variables and interact these dummy variables
with average peer ability.5.2 Heterogeneous effects by race
Up until this point, our findings have suggested that weaker students are more likely to
switch majors when faced with greater competition in the sciences. Black and Hispanic










Index of peer ability
of STEM majors
−0.211*** −0.120** −0.163*** −0.149*** 0.449**
[0.0387] [0.0448] [0.0409] [0.0172] [0.153]
Own math SAT score 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.0827*** 0.0154*** −0.0946***
[0.00372] [0.00538] [0.00477] [0.00224] [0.0240]
STEM major peer ability x 0.0204*** 0.0208** 0.00551 −0.000544 −0.0344
Own math score [0.00442] [0.00768] [0.00500] [0.00226] [0.0179]
Index of peer ability of non-STEM
majors
0.224*** 0.150** 0.0530 0.121*** −0.464**
[0.0349] [0.0471] [0.0312] [0.0154] [0.130]
Own verbal SAT score −0.0247*** −0.0275*** 0.0610*** −0.00105 −0.0330**
[0.00250] [0.00362] [0.00223] [0.00375] [0.0105]
Non-STEM major peer ability x −0.00426 −0.00541 0.00373** 7.18e-05 −0.00993
Own verbal score [0.00302] [0.00296] [0.00145] [0.00325] [0.0115]
Marginal effect of 1 SD increase in ability
of other intended science majors:
Own math SAT score = 550 −0.223*** −0.132** −0.167*** −0.149*** 0.469**
[0.0386] [0.0453] [0.0414] [0.0170] [0.147]
Own math SAT score = 650 −0.202*** −0.110** −0.161*** −0.149*** 0.434**
[0.0388] [0.0446] [0.0406] [0.0174] [0.158]
Observations 84,466 84,466 83,683 84,466 67,593
R-squared 0.306 0.289 0.435 0.306 0.317
Notes: Each column contains coefficient estimates from separate regressions. Each regression also contains controls for
race/ethnicity, UC-adjusted high school GPA, parental education, family income by cohort, college, college selectivity tier by
cohort, and UC application-admission pattern fixed effects that account for the intended major listed on each application.
Robust standard errors, clustered by campus, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, based on a
t-distribution with 5 d.f.
Luppino and Sander IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:4 Page 14 of 23(“URM”) students might seem to be particularly vulnerable; they tend to have lower
credentials than their peers, and our earlier analyses showed grade and graduation gaps
that may reflect unobserved racial differentials in college preparation. However, our
analyses suggest that URM students are less likely than other students to respond to
stronger STEM peers by switching from STEM to non-STEM fields; they are more likely
to persist than their non-URM peers, but they pay a price in terms of lower graduation
rates and college grades.
Because of racial preferences in college admissions, it is also important to evaluate
how minority groups are affected by peer quality in terms of their college outcomes.
Results, broken down by minority status, are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Non-
minority intending science majors appear to put more weight on peer quality within
the STEM and non-STEM fields in making their final major choice. In particular, non-
minority students are much more likely to exit the sciences when faced with stronger
STEM peers compared to under-represented minorities.
Being more persistent when faced with stronger peers within the sciences comes
with a cost for minority student groups. The results in Table 6 imply that attending a










Intended STEM majors −0.274** 0.0791 −0.315*** −0.425*** 0.268
[0.109] [0.131] [0.0732] [0.0855] [0.540]
Intended non-STEM 0.163 −0.0357 0.0807 0.207** −0.158
Majors [0.124] [0.134] [0.0588] [0.0626] [0.462]
Own Characteristics:
Math SAT score 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.0318 −0.00402 −0.0646
[0.0143] [0.0166] [0.0208] [0.0112] [0.0465]
Verbal SAT score −0.00592 −0.0163** 0.0797*** 0.0118 −0.105**
[0.00729] [0.00630] [0.0159] [0.0122] [0.0375]
UC-Adjusted HS GPA 0.112*** 0.0609*** 0.251*** 0.102*** −0.223***
[0.0104] [0.00639] [0.0162] [0.00653] [0.0355]
Observations 12,114 12,114 11,956 12,114 8,473
R-squared 0.483 0.484 0.561 0.489 0.529
Notes: Each column contains coefficient estimates from separate regressions. Each regression also contains controls for
parental education, family income by cohort, college, college selectivity tier by cohort, and UC application-admission
pattern fixed effects that account for the intended major listed on each application. Robust standard errors, clustered by
campus, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, based on a t-distribution with 5 d.f.
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science to have lower cumulative college GPAs and lower odds of graduating from
college. Increasing the ability of other intending science majors by one standard
deviation decreases the likelihood that URM intended STEM majors graduate from
college by around 43 percentage points. The same change in science peer ability
decreases the cumulative college GPA of black and Hispanic intended science majors
by approximately 0.32 points.
Much of the peer effects literature measures outcomes in terms of first-year grades,
while the principal grade outcome we examine is final GPA. Carrell et al. (2009) is an
exception; these authors found that a 100-point increase in the Verbal SAT scores of
freshmen squadron members, the equivalent of a standard deviation increase in test
score, raised the cumulative grades of U.S. Air Force Academy cadets by approximately
0.25 grade points. Our findings imply a standard deviation increase in science peer
quality lowers the final GPA of non-minority intending science majors by 0.125 points.
As noted earlier, our findings are not at all necessarily in conflict with those like
Carrell et al. because a squadron is a relatively small and cohesive group that exists in
an academic setting where collaboration and mutual support of squadron members is
expected. This type of environment stands in stark contrast to the competitive and
often cutthroat culture prevalent in the sciences.5.3 Robustness to alternative definitions of peer group and peer ability
Our analysis to this point has defined relevant peer groups based on intended major and
has used the principal component of average peer high school GPA, math SAT I score,










Intended STEM majors −0.181*** −0.125** −0.125** −0.116*** 0.416*
[0.0400] [0.0462] [0.0445] [0.0164] [0.184]
Intended non-STEM 0.225*** 0.161*** 0.0461 0.125*** −0.482**
Majors [0.0388] [0.0449] [0.0367] [0.0172] [0.155]
Own Characteristics:
Math SAT score 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.0912*** 0.0194*** −0.0980***
[0.00753] [0.00861] [0.00596] [0.00249] [0.0252]
Verbal SAT score −0.0265*** −0.0290*** 0.0592*** −0.00259 −0.0300**
[0.00319] [0.00566] [0.00489] [0.00384] [0.00971]
UC-Adjusted HS GPA 0.110*** 0.0634*** 0.291*** 0.0806*** −0.322***
[0.00518] [0.00776] [0.00528] [0.00465] [0.0202]
Observations 72,352 72,352 71,727 72,352 59,120
R-squared 0.296 0.283 0.424 0.298 0.302
Notes: Each column contains coefficient estimates from separate regressions. Each regression also contains controls for
parental education, family income by cohort, college, college selectivity tier by cohort, and UC application-admission
pattern fixed effects that account for the intended major listed on each application. Robust standard errors, clustered by
campus, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, based on a t-distribution with 5 d.f.
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presents results using a number of alternative measures of peer group ability. Specific-
ally, we consider specifications that instead use average high school grades, math SAT
score, verbal SAT score or combined SAT score as a measure of STEM and non-STEM
peer quality. All peer measures are standardized so that coefficient estimates of peer
effects are roughly comparable across specifications. The general magnitude, sign, and
statistical significance of our estimated effects do not vary much with these alternative
measures.
A significant finding of this paper is that peer effects stand out more clearly when we
use narrow, rather than broad measures of peer groups. Past research on peer effects
has often examined outcomes for entire college classes. In our analysis, such broad def-
initions would mask the most important peer effects, which are strong and significant
when we split peers into intended majors. Scholars examining these issues should be
careful to test for disaggregated effects like these.6 Conclusion
Using a rich dataset on the universe of University of California students who enrolled
between 1995 and 2003, we examine how the quality of potential peers within distinct
college majors at a student’s campus affects his or her major choices and other college
outcomes. We find that students initially interested in pursuing a science major
respond to peer quality within both the broad science and non-science major tracks.
Higher quality non-STEM peers appear to boost the non-STEM grades of intending
STEM majors, potentially lessening the risk of taking a greater share of STEM courses













Intended STEM majors −0.144** −0.0905 −0.122** −0.0977*** 0.499***
[0.0443] [0.0500] [0.0445] [0.0124] [0.138]
Intended non-STEM Majors 0.142*** 0.0917* 0.0737 0.0874*** −0.256
[0.0364] [0.0435] [0.0599] [0.0152] [0.201]
Combined SAT Score:
Intended STEM majors −0.179*** −0.0871* −0.142** −0.145*** 0.292**
[0.0384] [0.0425] [0.0463] [0.0198] [0.0948]
Intended non-STEM majors 0.193*** 0.124** 0.0347 0.111*** −0.391***
[0.0357] [0.0408] [0.0313] [0.0194] [0.100]
Math SAT Score:
Intended STEM majors −0.227*** −0.143** −0.129 −0.132*** 0.391*
[0.0454] [0.0516] [0.0822] [0.0243] [0.170]
Intended non-STEM majors 0.244*** 0.180** 0.0111 0.0918** −0.437*
[0.0478] [0.0566] [0.0743] [0.0313] [0.220]
Verbal SAT Score:
Intended STEM majors −0.115*** −0.0343 −0.125*** −0.120*** 0.147
[0.0294] [0.0272] [0.0285] [0.0171] [0.0906]
Intended non-STEM majors 0.134*** 0.0743** 0.0380** 0.0947*** −0.272***
[0.0260] [0.0262] [0.0156] [0.0129] [0.0518]
Notes: Each of the peer group ability definition groupings and each column contains coefficient estimates from separate
regressions. All peer measures are standardized. Each regression also contains controls for race/ethnicity, SAT I math and
verbal scores, UC-adjusted high school GPA, parental education, family income by cohort, college, college selectivity tier
by cohort, and UC application-admission pattern fixed effects that account for the intended major listed on each application.
Robust standard errors, clustered by campus, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, based on a t-distribution
with 5 d.f.
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group of intending science majors lowers the likelihood that students graduate with a
science degree. While some of those students who leave the sciences simply shift their
course of study, others fail to graduate at all. We take strong measures to ensure that
these findings are not driven by peer group endogeneity.
Consistent with mismatch theories, we find that weaker students are particularly
adversely affected by attending colleges where the sciences are more competitive.
Perhaps most striking, we find that underrepresented minorities are much less likely
than non-minorities to respond to higher STEM peer quality by switching majors.
Instead, minority students interested in science are much more likely to drop out
when they are placed among stronger STEM peers, and, if they do graduate, they take
a very substantial hit on their GPAs. What accounts for this race effect? Perhaps
minority students have a stronger commitment to pursuing science and are willing to
bear the risk of not graduating in order to pursue their dream of becoming a scientist.
Julian (2012) provides Synthetic Work-Life Earnings (SWE) estimates that suggest that
those with a STEM degree on average can expect to earn approximately $600,000
more than holders of non-STEM degrees over their work-life. Even if one were to
Luppino and Sander IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:4 Page 18 of 23adjust these estimates to reflect the risk of not successfully completing a degree, it
would appear that minorities still face higher expected lifetime earnings by pursuing
STEM over non-STEM degrees.
Or perhaps, minority students are less likely to know how to maneuver the college
landscape. Perhaps they underestimate the potential risks of failing to meet graduation
requirements when pursuing different types of degrees. Our data does not allow us to
evaluate these alternate hypotheses. Future research in this area should evaluate
whether these particular patterns of minority attrition hold in other instances. The
general problem of science attrition, as shown by this and other research, is sufficiently
serious that universities should attempt careful measurement of evolving student
attitudes and outcomes as they enter and advance through college.7 Endnotes
1Arcidiacono et al. (2013) examine how well different UC campuses produce STEM
graduates. These authors focus on net differences across institutions. What distinguishes
our work is that we focus on identifying how a particular institutional characteristic, major
peer group quality, influences STEM major choice.
2See, for example, Smyth and McArdle (2004) and Arcidiacono et al. (2013).
3In particular, the index weights verbal and math SAT scores equally. However, we
argue that math skills are more predictive of success in the sciences and that verbal
skills are more predictive of success in other disciplines (and, therefore, possibly of
selection out of the sciences).
4SAT verbal and math scores for tests taken prior to 1995 have been re-centered to
be comparable to later scores.
5See Hyslop and Imbens (2001).
6Following Arcidiacono (2004), we also considered specifications with multiple mea-
sures of peer quality. These results are qualitatively similar to those found using single
measures of peer quality. As Black and Smith (2006) note, the high degree of correl-
ation between different measures of peer ability make it difficult to interpret individual
coefficient estimates for specific measures when multiple measures are included in the
empirical model. For this reason, our main specifications rely on peer quality indices
constructed through a principal component analysis of multiple potential measures of
peer quality. The principal component scoring is reported in Table 9, and summary
statistics for the constructed peer ability indices, broken down by campus and cohort,
are reported in Table 10 of the Appendix.
7We are able to observe the ELC status of students after this policy is adopted.
8In his analysis of the effects of Proposition 209 on college enrollment patterns at the
University of California, Hinrichs (2012) groups campuses into two tiers: the top and
bottom four. His results based on these aggregated groupings are reported to be similar
to those that allow for separate estimates by campus. Our results are also similar if we
use alternative definitions of selectivity tiers.
9Family income is reported as a categorical variable and in nominal terms. Therefore,
we include in our specification a set of family income category by cohort fixed effects.
10This would not appear to be a particularly strong assumption, as intending STEM majors
would likely represent a small portion of students in non-STEM courses and vice versa.
Luppino and Sander IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:4 Page 19 of 2311We do observe the number of trimesters attended, but only for those students that
graduate (i.e., time to degree). We also consider the effects of peer quality on time to
degree. However, this analysis is somewhat problematic because it involves a selected
sample of students where selection occurs based on an outcome variable. Therefore,
those results are not necessarily informative as to how peer quality affects students on
the margin of graduating.
12In these analyses, we have classified a student’s intended major based on the choice
she made on the college application to the campus in which she eventually enrolled.
Some students express different intentions on different applications – they may list a
STEM field in their application to UC Davis, but humanities in their application to
Berkeley. If one classifies as an “intending STEM” major anyone who indicates a STEM
preference on any UC application, this picks up more students – but it does not have
much effect on the results in Table 3. Conversely, if one classifies as an intended STEM
major only those students who indicate a STEM preference on all UC applications, this
produces a smaller sample of intending STEM majors, but again our findings hold
steady.
13The UCOP data does not tell us the timing or history of changes to a student’s
intended field of study. We only observe the student’s entering preferences and her
final major, which is the last official major registered by the student before she exited
the UC system (either by graduating or dropping out).
14The corresponding wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value is 0.035.
8 Appendix
8.1 Imputation of SAT I Scores and High School GPA
Instead of reporting the exact high school GPA and SAT I scores for students, the
UCOP contains an academic index, which is a weighted linear combination of SAT I
math (m) and verbal (v) scores and high school GPA (g):
Indexi ¼ cþ wmxm;i þ wvxv;i þ wgxg;i: ðviiÞ
Each of the weights (w) and the constant (c) in this equation are known, while the x*terms represent the unobserved true values of a student’s SAT scores and high school
GPA.
The UCOP data also reports categorical ranges for each student’s scores and GPA,





j; i for each j ∈ m; v; g½ ; ðviiiÞ
where the zero superscript represents that these bounds are those that are initiallyreported in the data.
We can rearrange the terms in equation (ix) to express the unknown math score as a














Similarly, we can write this expression for verbal score and high school GPA. Giventhe initial upper and lower bounds reported in the data and equation (xi), we first attempt
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running the following algorithm:
until all bounds converge (e.g. xRj; i ¼ xR−1j; i and xRj; i ¼ xR−1j; i for each j ∈ [m, v, g]). In
running this algorithm, we additionally take advantage of the discrete nature of SAT
scores and high school GPA to further tighten the revised upper and lower bounds
implied by the data for each of our unobserved measures.
One can envision constructing imputed measures as weighted averages of the
revised upper and lower bounds:
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(xiv) into equation (xv) for each unobserved variable we get:
Indexi ¼ cþ umxRm; i þ lmxRm; i þ uvxRv; i þ lvxRv; i þ ugxRg; i þ lgxRg; i; ðxviÞ
where uj = wjaj and lj =wj(1 − aj) for each j ∈ [m, v, g]. It also follows that:
aj ¼ ujuj þ lj : ðxviiÞ
We can estimate equation (xviii) using regression analysis and construct the implied
weights based on the corresponding coefficient estimates. Specifically, we estimate the
following regression model for each vigintile (q) of the academic index distribution:





þ βvqxRv; i þ βv
qx
R
v; i þ βg qxRg; i þ βg
qx
R
g; i þ εi: ðxixÞ
The correspondence between this regression model and equation (xx) implies thatappropriate weights should be constructed such that:
aqj ¼
β^ qj
β^ qj þ β^j
q
; for each j ∈ m ; m; v ; v; g ; g
h i
: ðxxiÞ
Using these weights and the revised upper and lower bounds for each unobserved
variable, we then construct imputed values for each student’s unobserved high school






Average SAT I Math Score 0.994 0.989
Average SAT I Verbal Score 0.975 0.954
Average UC-Adjusted HSGPA 0.976 0.977
8.2 Appendix Tables
Table 10 Summary statistics for peer ability indices and residual peer ability indices by
campus and cohort
Index of peer ability Residual index of peer ability
STEM Non-STEM STEM Non-STEM
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Berkeley
1995-1997 1.4555 0.0002 1.1805 0.0003 0.0243 0.0245 −0.0158 0.0173
1998-2000 1.6181 0.0002 1.5583 0.0002 −0.0105 0.0095 0.0080 0.0083
2001-2003 1.6000 0.0002 1.4567 0.0002 −0.0131 0.0184 0.0073 0.0139
All 1.5589 0.0725 1.4007 0.1590 0.0000 0.0251 0.0000 0.0175
Los Angeles
1995-1997 0.5979 0.0002 0.6388 0.0002 −0.0227 0.0317 0.0147 0.0232
1998-2000 1.0830 0.0002 1.1922 0.0002 0.0092 0.0132 −0.0070 0.0106
2001-2003 1.1367 0.0002 1.1498 0.0002 0.0111 0.0189 −0.0062 0.0139
Table 10 Summary statistics for peer ability indices and residual peer ability indices by
campus and cohort (Continued)
Index of peer ability Residual index of peer ability
STEM Non-STEM STEM Non-STEM
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Berkeley
1995-1997 1.4555 0.0002 1.1805 0.0003 0.0243 0.0245 −0.0158 0.0173
1998-2000 1.6181 0.0002 1.5583 0.0002 −0.0105 0.0095 0.0080 0.0083
2001-2003 1.6000 0.0002 1.4567 0.0002 −0.0131 0.0184 0.0073 0.0139
All 1.5589 0.0725 1.4007 0.1590 0.0000 0.0251 0.0000 0.0175
Los Angeles
1995-1997 0.5979 0.0002 0.6388 0.0002 −0.0227 0.0317 0.0147 0.0232
1998-2000 1.0830 0.0002 1.1922 0.0002 0.0092 0.0132 −0.0070 0.0106
2001-2003 1.1367 0.0002 1.1498 0.0002 0.0111 0.0189 −0.0062 0.0139
All 0.9518 0.2378 1.0063 0.2465 0.0000 0.0270 0.0000 0.0192
San Diego
1995-1997 0.2989 0.0002 0.6030 0.0002 −0.0401 0.0340 0.0381 0.0299
1998-2000 0.6416 0.0002 0.9385 0.0002 −0.0101 0.0158 0.0146 0.0168
2001-2003 0.7347 0.0002 0.9625 0.0002 0.0378 0.0329 −0.0400 0.0326
All 0.5786 0.1831 0.8505 0.1586 0.0000 0.0436 0.0000 0.0434
Davis
1995-1997 −0.1687 0.0002 −0.5313 0.0002 0.0207 0.0344 −0.0035 0.0254
1998-2000 −0.1490 0.0002 −0.5018 0.0002 0.0196 0.0255 −0.0230 0.0295
2001-2003 −0.2904 0.0001 −0.3817 0.0002 −0.0326 0.0450 0.0224 0.0371
All −0.2087 0.0647 −0.4646 0.0661 0.0000 0.0446 0.0000 0.0370
Irvine
1995-1997 −0.8159 0.0002 −1.0736 0.0002 0.0159 0.0295 −0.0342 0.0450
1998-2000 −0.4559 0.0002 −0.5296 0.0002 −0.0125 0.0245 0.0121 0.0231
2001-2003 −0.2256 0.0002 −0.2415 0.0002 −0.0008 0.0321 0.0146 0.0351
All −0.4688 0.2382 −0.5722 0.3369 0.0000 0.0311 0.0000 0.0410
Santa Barbara
1995-1997 −1.0099 0.0003 −0.9739 0.0002 −0.0027 0.0259 −0.0184 0.0336
1998-2000 −0.2558 0.0002 −0.2593 0.0002 0.0126 0.0206 −0.0061 0.0193
2001-2003 −0.2257 0.0002 −0.1633 0.0002 −0.0094 0.0348 0.0228 0.0391
All −0.4885 0.3600 −0.4563 0.3593 0.0000 0.0294 0.0000 0.0364
Santa Cruz
1995-1997 −1.2431 0.0006 −0.9166 0.0004 0.0197 0.0301 −0.0029 0.0244
1998-2000 −1.0628 0.0004 −0.7574 0.0003 −0.0004 0.0214 −0.0044 0.0195
2001-2003 −1.1463 0.0004 −0.8177 0.0002 −0.0118 0.0314 0.0053 0.0342
All −1.1435 0.0685 −0.8231 0.0607 0.0000 0.0308 0.0000 0.0280
Riverside
1995-1997 −1.8061 0.0007 −1.6483 0.0005 −0.0178 0.0307 0.0443 0.0670
1998-2000 −1.7132 0.0004 −1.6632 0.0003 −0.0171 0.0316 0.0127 0.0248
2001-2003 −1.6484 0.0002 −1.8592 0.0002 0.0209 0.0394 −0.0299 0.0550
All −1.7032 0.0600 −1.7489 0.1005 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000 0.0581
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